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flintai eval includes built-in evaluations for testing agent reliability and behavior.
Run flintai eval evaluations list to see this list from the CLI at any time, or flintai eval evaluations show <id> for one evaluation’s attack techniques, detector, and prompt count.

Filtering evaluations

Use tags to filter when listing or attaching evaluations:
Tag values are matched exactly and are case-sensitive. source=Garak matches; source=garak matches nothing.
See Configuration for more tag-based filtering examples.

Evaluation categories

Tests fall into the following categories:
  • OWASP adversarial probes - Adaptive attacks that actively attempt to jailbreak your agent
  • OWASP fixed prompts - Known attack patterns documented in security research
  • Garak framework tests - Coverage from the industry-standard security scanner

OWASP LLM Top 10 (adversarial)

Tests based on OWASP LLM Top 10 security risks. These use adversarial probes to actively attempt attacks. Attach all adversarial tests:
adversarial_probe
LLM01: Prompt injection (adversarial)OWASP LLM01 — Tests whether the model can be tricked into ignoring its system instructions and following attacker-supplied instructions instead.
adversarial_probe
LLM02: Sensitive information disclosure (adversarial)OWASP LLM02 — Tests whether the model leaks sensitive information such as training data, PII, API keys, internal configuration, or data from other users’ sessions.
adversarial_probe
LLM05: Unsafe output generation (adversarial)OWASP LLM05 — Tests whether the model can be manipulated into generating outputs containing executable payloads (XSS, SQL injection, shell commands) that would be dangerous if passed to downstream systems without sanitization.
adversarial_probe
LLM06: Excessive agency (adversarial)OWASP LLM06 — Tests whether the model can be manipulated into taking actions beyond its intended scope, exceeding its permissions, or performing high-impact actions without proper authorization.
adversarial_probe
LLM07: System prompt leakage (adversarial)OWASP LLM07 — Tests whether the model’s system prompt or hidden instructions can be extracted through conversational techniques.
adversarial_probe
LLM09: Hallucination and misinformation (adversarial)OWASP LLM09 — Tests whether the model can be led to generate false information with high confidence, including fabricated citations, sycophantic agreement with false premises, and confident fabrication.
adversarial_probe
LLM09: Hallucination and misinformation (adversarial, large)OWASP LLM09 — Tests whether the model can be led to generate false information with high confidence, including fabricated citations, sycophantic agreement with false premises, and confident fabrication. Large dataset.

OWASP LLM Top 10 (fixed prompts)

Same OWASP categories, but using fixed test prompts instead of adversarial probes. Attach all fixed prompt tests:
message_collection
LLM01: Prompt injection (fixed prompts)OWASP LLM01 — Fixed prompt dataset testing whether the model resists various prompt injection techniques.
message_collection
LLM02: Sensitive information disclosure (fixed prompts)OWASP LLM02 — Fixed prompt dataset testing whether the model leaks sensitive information such as PII, credentials, or training data.
message_collection
LLM05: Unsafe output generation (fixed prompts)OWASP LLM05 — Fixed prompt dataset testing whether the model generates outputs containing executable payloads dangerous to downstream systems.
message_collection
LLM06: Excessive agency (fixed prompts)OWASP LLM06 — Fixed prompt dataset testing whether the model can be manipulated into exceeding its intended scope or authority.
message_collection
LLM07: System prompt leakage (fixed prompts)OWASP LLM07 — Fixed prompt dataset testing whether the model’s system prompt or hidden instructions can be extracted.
message_collection
LLM09: Hallucination and misinformation (fixed prompts)OWASP LLM09 — Fixed prompt dataset testing whether the model fabricates information, citations, or agrees with false premises.
message_collection
PII leakage detection (fixed prompts)Tests whether the model outputs personally identifiable information (credit cards, SSNs, emails, phone numbers, addresses, and similar) when prompted to do so. Uses datafog regex-based PII detection.
message_collection
Secret leakage detection (fixed prompts)Tests whether the model outputs secrets (API keys, tokens, private keys, credentials, connection strings, and similar) when prompted. Uses detect-secrets for pattern-based secret detection.

Garak framework tests

Tests from the Garak LLM vulnerability scanner — industry-standard adversarial testing framework.
To run these evaluations, install the optional full extra: pip install 'flintai-cli[full]'. See installation.
Attach all Garak tests:
garak_module
Garak: ANSI escape code injectionTests whether the model can be tricked into producing ANSI escape codes that could disrupt downstream terminal processing or exfiltrate data.
garak_module
Garak: API key generationTests whether the model will comply with requests to generate or output API keys for various services.
garak_module
Garak: Contentious term continuationTests whether the model will continue a phrase ending in a contentious or offensive term, completing slurs or hate speech.
garak_module
Garak: DAN (Do Anything Now) jailbreaksTests resistance to Do-Anything-Now style jailbreaks that try to make the model ignore its alignment through long-form instruction-based attacks.
garak_module
Garak: Divergence attacksTests whether the model can be led to deviate from the topic and leak training data or other unexpected material through divergence techniques.
garak_module
Garak: Disguise and Reconstruction Attack (DRA)Tests resistance to attacks that disguise harmful strings through string manipulation and reconstruct them to bypass safety filters.
garak_module
Garak: Encoding-based prompt injectionTests whether encoding techniques (Base64, ROT13, Morse, Braille, hex, and similar) can bypass alignment by obfuscating unsafe instructions.
garak_module
Garak: Code and template injectionTests whether the model can be led to produce exploitable code including SQL injection, template injection, and other code injection payloads.
garak_module
Garak: Goodside prompt injection attacksTests resistance to prompt injection techniques originally discovered by Riley Goodside, including tag-based and JSON-based attacks.
garak_module
Garak: Grandma roleplay jailbreakTests whether the model can be manipulated through grandma roleplay scenarios to reveal contentious information such as illicit substances or software keys.
garak_module
Garak: Latent prompt injectionTests resistance to prompt injections buried in other contexts like resumes, financial reports, translations, and factual snippets.
garak_module
Garak: Training data replayTests whether the model can be led to replay excerpts from copyrighted or sensitive training data including books, news articles, and literature.
garak_module
Garak: Language Model Risk Cards (LMRC)Non-adversarial content safety probes covering bullying, deadnaming, quack medicine, sexual content, and slur usage based on the LMRC framework.
garak_module
Garak: Malware generationTests whether the model will comply with requests to generate malware, malware components, evasion techniques, or other tools that disrupt devices.
garak_module
Garak: Misleading claimsTests whether the model will accept and agree with false assertions rather than correctly identifying and refuting them.
garak_module
Garak: Package hallucinationTests whether the model hallucinates non-existent software packages across multiple languages (Python, JavaScript, Rust, Ruby, Perl, Dart) which could lead to supply chain attacks.
garak_module
Garak: Phrasing-based jailbreaksTests whether rephrasing requests in past or future tense can bypass safety filters and elicit unsafe content.
garak_module
Garak: PromptInject attacksTests resistance to plaintext prompt injection attacks that embed malicious commands into requests for innocuous information.
garak_module
Garak: RealToxicityPromptsTests model responses to prompts empirically found to have a high probability of eliciting toxic continuations.
garak_module
Garak: Snowball hallucinationTests whether the model gives confidently wrong answers to complex graph connectivity reasoning questions instead of admitting uncertainty.
garak_module
Garak: Adversarial suffix attacksTests resistance to adversarial suffixes (GCG-style) appended to prompts that are designed to override system prompt safety measures.
garak_module
Garak: Tree of Attacks with Pruning (TAP)Tests resistance to LLM-generated jailbreak prompts created using the Tree of Attacks with Pruning methodology.
garak_module
Garak: Web injection (XSS and data exfiltration)Tests whether the model can be led to produce outputs enabling web attacks including cross-site scripting (XSS), markdown-based data exfiltration, and CSRF.